We assess how events in the Middle East have affected Asian bond markets, the policy response, and why the region remains resilient.
In July 2026, US President Donald Trump declared an end to the ceasefire with Iran following strikes on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, reigniting market concerns that had briefly dissipated. On the policy front, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) kept interest rates on hold; however, three Federal Open Market Committee members called for tighter conditions. In turn, US Treasury yields remained elevated. For Asian local-currency bond markets, there were differing responses among net energy exporters and importers, along with a growing reliance on policy tools other than adjustments to benchmark interest rates.
Renewed hostilities between the US and Iran saw energy prices move higher, which, in turn, increased inflationary concerns and triggered expectations that major central banks would keep their policies restrictive.
Brent crude surpassed US$100 a barrel for the first time since May 2026 before settling back down at around US$88 a barrel by the end of the month.1 Tanker traffic through the Strait fell sharply through the second half of July 2026 as tankers avoided the waterway or obscured their movements.2
For Asian bond markets, the impact extends beyond headline spikes in commodity prices. A persistent energy shock can affect local bond markets in three ways. Firstly, imported inflation places pressure on central banks to remain hawkish even when domestic growth is soft. Also, a widening trade deficit weakens currencies and raises the cost of external financing. Lastly, there is a broader reduction in risk appetite, which prompts foreign capital outflows from local markets.
Policy responses across Asia varied based on each market’s trade position and how much room central banks had to absorb the pressure.
As a net oil and gas exporter, Malaysia experienced relatively less inflationary passthrough compared to its regional peers. Bank Negara Malaysia maintained its overnight policy rate at 2.75%, citing resilient underlying growth and contained domestic price pressures.3
Despite being a net energy importer, Thailand saw its 10-year government bond yield fall after the Bank of Thailand reaffirmed its accommodative policy stance in a move to prioritize growth over aggressive currency defense.4
Conversely, the Philippine peso fell to record lows amid rising oil prices, placing immediate pressure on the central bank to provide support. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas opted for measured foreign exchange actions rather than aggressive intervention, remaining cautious about depleting its reserves in an uncoordinated manner.
Where rate policy was more constrained, governments increasingly turned to tools that have the potential to build more structural, less rate-sensitive demand for local bonds.
In Japan, fiscal supply concerns and energy-driven inflation pushed the 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yield to a multi-decade high of 2.88% on 9 July 2026. Yields temporarily eased after Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama floated adding JGBs to the tax-free Nippon Individual Savings Account program and reviewing Government Pension Investment Fund portfolio allocations – signaling an effort to mobilize domestic retail and pension capital, even if formal policy authority over the fund remains distinct.
Other measures proved more concrete, with South Korea's finance ministry allowing foreign institutions to borrow South Korean won through temporary overdrafts and use won-denominated bonds as collateral, thereby widening access to its currency market. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority more than doubled its Renminbi (RMB) Business Facility to RMB 500 billion (approximately US$74 billion), which boosted liquidity access for those banks handling offshore RMB funding.5
The events of July 2026 highlighted the different ways Asian economies can absorb geopolitical shocks. They also showed how banks can provide support to local bond markets.
This bond market uncertainty moved in tandem with a broader repricing of assets across the region. Of note, South Korea’s KOSPI Index retreated in July 2026, prompted by adjustments to technology-related valuations and disappointing semiconductor company earnings. During some trading sessions, heavy foreign equity selling coincided with a weaker South Korean won, while during others the South Korean won remained steady even as share prices fell. This demonstrated how events in the equity and foreign exchange markets can be reflected in bond yields.
While sovereign bond yields rose and local currencies came under pressure, Asian investment-grade spreads remained tight, supported by limited supply and well-managed corporate balance sheets.
Managing bond markets is no longer just a matter of adjusting benchmark interest rates. As investors evaluate allocations, the resilience of Asian local-currency bonds will likely depend less on regional central banks matching Fed hawkishness and more on how policymakers deploy structural buffers when pressures mount.